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BOOK REVIEWS
LIF'n INSURANCE AND ESTATE TAX PLANNING. William J. Bowe. Nash-
ville, Tennessee: Vanderbilt University Press, 1950. Pp. 92.
There have been debates among the learned through the ages re-
specting the economic, sociological, and ethical impact of the "right"
to inherit property. Bentham was probably among the first to sug-
gest that, providing there will be no impairment of productivity, the
maximum happiness of society would be realized by distributing wealth
equally. Only the years can reveal the degree of wisdom in such a
course, but apparently our present-day tax planners have chosen to ignore
the proviso clause of the aforementioned concept and have concentrated
on a simple method to achieve economic equality; namely, by taxing ac-
cumulated private wealth out of existence. However, for each mind
devoted to the development of this end, there is a counterpart concerned
with and devising methods of avoiding, or at least delaying, the inevitable
consequence of such a program. Not the least of these is Professor
Bowe, who has written powerfully respecting tax avoidance by proper
estate planning.1
In this slim volume, he tries again to help resolve some of the more
intricate problems of estate tax planning, this time restricting his dis-
cussion entirely to aspects of the use, or failure to use, any of the various
forms of insurance in an estate plan. Even so, it would appear that,
in this book, the author fails to live up to the promise of previous writ-
ings. Obviously, in any short work, there is a tendency toward gener-
ality, but the material here found, although in many ways helpful, is
much too general to afford any concrete help.
It is all too often assumed, in the text, that an ideal state of affairs
will continue to exist in the estate being planned, so that the suggestions
offered often fail to cope with the potentialities of reality. For example,
there is quite a discussion of the use of insurance as a means of buying
up a business interest in such a manner as to provide liquidity for the
estate and continuity of management in the decedent's beneficiaries. In
particular, the author outlines the device whereby a closely-held corpora-
tion, holding insurance on the decedent, may buy up his shares to the
advantage of one and all. Nowhere is there a suggestion that it might
be unlawful for the corporation to buy its shares because of statutory
prohibition or an impairment of the capital structure at the time of the
1 See, for example, Bowe, Tax Planning for Estate (Vanderbilt University Press,
Nashville, Tennessee, 1949), reviewed in 28 CHiCAGO-KENT LAW RE ViEw 186.
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decedent's death.2  What then is the worth of the plan? There is no
desire to intimate that the book will not prove of interest to the prac-
titioner, the trust man, and the insurance underwriter. There is, how-
ever, occasion to feel that the true utility of the work has been sacrificed
for the sake of brevity.
THE LAW OF LABOR RELATIONS. Benjamin Werne. New York: The Mac-
millan Company, 1951. Pp. xiv, 741.
Specialization has progressed, in some fields of law, to such an extent
that the general practitioner of today is apt to be considered a dodo or else
finds that he wears the emblem of his general practitionership with dis-
comfort. Law schools must, of necessity, prepare the student for full
legal life but, within the limits of crowded curricula, are unable to include
more than a few particular legal subjects among the general-knowledge
courses.' Modern society, however, treating law as a means of social con-
trol, finds it impossible to ignore the overlap, if any there be between gen-
eralized and particularized subjects, and expects lawyers to go afield 2
just as governments call on others beside political scientists for aid.'
This particularizing of law, with its tendency to make the subject in-
trovertistic, leads to congeries of theories and rules pertaining solely to
specific fields. Eventually, the point is reached where even the proverbial
Philadelphia lawyer throws up his hands and concedes defeat.4  The
specialist's specialist then takes over and the general practitioner finds
2 Scovill, "Treasury. Stock in its Relation to Earned Surplus," 21 CHICAGO-KENT
LAW REvImw 328-32. For a more pragmatic approach to stock purchase plans, see
Davis, Life Insurance and Business Purchase Agreements (National Life Ins. Co.,
Montpelier, Vermont, 1948), 2d Ed.
' See Currie, "The Materials of Law Study," 3 J. Legal Ed. 331 (1951), for a
discussion of the problems arising from the antagonisms inherent in the general
and the particular approaches.
2 The New York Times, under date of Dec. 20, 1950, reports that Federal District
Judge Wyzanski appointed a Harvard assistant professor of economics as his law
clerk to assist him in the anti-trust suit against the United Shoe Machinery
Corporation.
3 The Full Employment Bill of 1946 makes economists part and parcel of top
governmental policy formulation. Governor Dewey, creating the New York State
Crime Commission, called together a practicing lawyer, a law school dean, a retired
educator, a former police commissioner, and a one-time diplomat.
4 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 at 412,
55 S. Ct. 241, 79 L. Ed. 446 at 454 (1935), noted how all the parties and the lower
court were unaware of the presence of certain amendments which had been made to
the Petroleum Code because of the absence of a requirement for their publication in
any particular place. As a probable consequence of his remarks, the Federal
Register Act was passed.
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he is ousted from another field of revenue.5 Under these circumstances,
the average lawyer who has been retained in a matter falling within one
of these narrow fields either associates himself with a specialist or attempts
to work alone, endeavoring to combat a specialist on the other side. As
their respective armories are not stocked alike, the odds are weighted
heavily against the uninitiated. To prepare himself, the tyro seeks for
new and specialized weapons or tools. The plethora of texts, guides,
handbooks, digests and the like attest to the prevalence of these conditions
and to the effort that has been made to find some way out of the difficulty.
Labor law is no different from other specialties in this regard. Ex-
cept on such points as relate to social legislation generally, 6 or to in-
junctions and picketing7 and other areas where the judicial process is
involved, the field of collective bargaining has itself become specialized to
a degree not dreamt of in pre-Wagner Act days. At first, when bargaining
did not resemble a name-calling jamboree, the prime issues were union
recognition and wages and hours. Following the Wagner Act, experience
with fringe incursions began to develop. The activities of the War Labor
Board and of similar emergency agencies added little that was new. But
since 1945, and under modern conditions, bargaining has become of im-
portance in areas relating to pensions, guaranteed work, grievance pro-
cedure and arbitration as well as over the point of disclosure of secret
financial data to unions. Save in certain areas of the South, the principle
expressed in Section 7 of the Taft-Hartley Act has been generally accepted
and followed. But recognition does not, ipso facto, produce a trade agree-
ment. It is here that labor and management today engage in their most
heated controversies. Whether lawyers will be an aid or an obstruction
in collective bargaining is presently unimportant8 for the fact is that the
participants generally utilize their services.
Unfortunately, experience gained in general practice in the negotia-
tion of ordinary contracts is not of great value in this particular area for
collective bargaining has created a jargon and an approach that is pecu-
liarly its own. The general practitioner needs must bring the specialist's
5 The resentment may lead to suits such as the case of In re Bercu, 299 N. Y.
728, 87 N. E. (2d) 451 (1949), wherein accountants were prohibited from giving
legal advice on tax questions. The New York County Lawyers Association, through
its Chairman of the Committee on Unlawful Practice, discloses that another front
is being opened with an investigation against estate planners because there is a
"fringe of so-called 'experts' who are neither insurance men nor lawyers" deluding
the public. See 7 Bar Bull. 16 (1949).
6 See the author's article on "Planning and Teaching a Course in Labor Law,"
to appear in the Summer, 1951, issue of the Journal of Legal Education.
7 Forkosch, "Equity versus Taft-Hartley Injunctions," 24 Temp. L. Q. 277 (1951).
8 See Sherman, "The Law Student and Collective Bargaining," 3 J. Legal Ed. 445
(1951).
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tools to bear, else he will not be called again. How, then, can Lawyer X
obtain the essential "know-how"? He is experienced with the use of
treatises, texts and form books developed in other areas of the law, but
encyclopedic treatises on labor law will provide no help. It is for just
this reason that lesser studies have been made by Dunlop,9 by Tucker,10
and by Shulman and Chamberlain," to mention only three, in addition to
material which has been compiled in loose-leaf services and legal magazines.
That all such varied attempts have not been completely successful is
attested to by the publication of the instant volume.'
2
There may be some degree of misnomer in the title of this book if the
reader is led to believe that the work was intended to discuss all of labor's
ramified efforts to better itself. It is primarily the fields of the Taft-
Hartley Act, of collective bargaining, and of the trade agreement which
Mr. Werne has entered, but even these would, ordinarily, be too wide to
cover adequately in a single volume. The book is one, however, geared
to practical use and develops four principal topics, i. e. representation,
prevention of unfair labor practices, rights and duties of management
and unions, and collective contracts. The space allotted to each, approx-
imately one-third for the first two, and one-third each for the third and
fourth, gives some indication of the author's opinion as to their relative
importance.
The first three parts deal almost exclusively with decisions of the
National Labor Relations Board. The discussion is pithy and presents
the law both succinctly and well. While the layman might find himself
lost in the midst of the plentiful documentation, the average lawyer should
find much to aid him to reach a particularized understanding in this field.
But the major questions he will be inclined to ask will be what is the
present status of the law, how up-to-date is the material offered? Although
the book is a 1951 publication, it stops short at about September, 1950.
Later Board determinations have tended to make the work outmoded, but
definitely not obsolete.
For example, in the discussion of secondary boycotts, there is no
mention of the Sterling Beverage or the Schultz Refrigerated Service
cases 13 although the Board made a major policy modification in Senator
9 Dunlop, Collective Bargaining Principles and Cases (Chicago, Richard D. Irwin,
1949).
10 Tucker, Guide to National Labor Relations Act (Chicago, Commerce Clearing
House, 1947). Miss Tucker's excellent compilation, unfortunately, is not up to date.
11 Shulman and Chamberlain, Cases on Labor Relations (Brooklyn, The Founda-
tion Press, Inc., 1949).
12 The author Is Adjunct Professor of Industrial Relations, Graduate School of
Business Administration, New York University.
13 90 N. L. R. B. 75 (1950) and 87 N. L. R. B. 82 (1950), respectively.
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Taft's outright condemnation by accepting to some slight degree the New
York "unity of interest" doctrine.14 Also missing, although the omission
is understandable, is reference to the fact that the Board, in October,
1950, promulgated standards or requirements to be met before it would
exercise jurisdiction over interstate enterprises too small in character to
warrant the utilization of the Board's limited resources.15 There would also
seem to be no mention of the holdings in the Hughes, Hanke and Gazzam
cases which validate state limitations upon union picketing. 6 The time
factor would make some of these omissions understandable, but others are
not open to that explanation. The presence of error may also be noted.
The author states, at pages 237-8, in relation to the discussion of strikes
and boycotts under Section 8(b) (4) (A-C), that it is the function of the
Board's "regional director" to make application for a temporary injunc-
tion, pursuant to Section 10. In fact, the statute specifically provides for
an independent General Counsel whose duty it is to make such decisions
and whose refusal to issue a complaint is final and non-reviewable. It is
more likely that the author meant the "regional attorney" under the
General Counsel rather than the "regional director" of the Board.
Despite these criticisms and other time and error defects, the over-
all view of the volume is generally good. True, the first three parts offer
nothing the practitioner cannot get elsewhere but the manner of presenta-
tion and organization is competent and commendable. It is in the fourth
part, dealing with collective contracts, that the prime worth of the book
is demonstrated. It contains a capable discussion of both the theories and
actualities underlying collective bargaining, covering not only the prepa-
ration therefor and the drafting thereof but also the operation thereunder.
Typical contractual clauses have been offered in support of both the
drafting and the operating chapters.1" If a work could be said to con-
centrate on any one topic so as to place other topics in the shade, the
14 See Forkosch, "Secondary Boycotts Under the Taft-Hartley Law," 1 Labor L. J.
1009 (1951), for a discussion thereof.
15 National Labor Relations Board, Release No. R-357, digests these standards.
The standards were applied to a limited degree in the secondary boycott case of
Jamestown Builders Exchange, 93 N. L. R. B. 51 (1951). See the writer's forth-
coming article entitled "National Labor Relations Board Jurisdictional Require-
ments in Secondary Boycott Cases," to appear in the April, 1951, issue of Labor
Law Journal.
16 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 70 S. Ct. 718, 94 L. Ed. 985 (1950):
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U. S. 470, 70 S. Ct. 773, 94
L. Ed. 995 (1950) ; Building Service Employees Internat'l Un. v. Gazzam, 339 U. S.
532, 70 S. Ct. 784, 94 L. Ed. 1045 (1950). As no table of cases appears in the book,
a reader would be obliged to examine almost one hundred pages of footnotes to
verify this fact. The task would be an impossible one for the busy practicing
attorney. The omission should be corrected in a future edition.
17 It might have been worthwhile to have presented a "typical" completed agree-
ment as an appendix, so that the reader could see the independent clauses tied
together into a masterly whole.
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emphasis here is clearly on this part. For that reason, the book should
recommend itself to Lawyer X, for it provides the essential "know how."
While that recommendation is not made entirely without reservation,
the book deserves the characterization of being a workmanlike job quite
likely to aid the uninitiated. In numerous respects it contains a wealth
of information conveniently gathered and ably presented.
MORRis D. FORKOSCH*
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A Comparative Study, Vol. III. Ernst Rabel.
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Law School (Michigan Legal
Studies series). Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1950. Pp. xlvi, 611.
A person who has been privileged to examine the first two volumes of
this monumental comparison of the principles relating to choice of law,
in those fields where one of two or more systems of law may become
applicable, is likely to approach the third volume with preconceived
notions as to the excellence of the material which awaits him. He has
already, on two occasions, been impressed with the wide learning and
indefatigable industry of the author. He has, in like fashion, been led
to see a vast panorama of law unfolding according to a highly articulate,
well-organized plan. The experience received from reading the textual
statement of existing rules, with the frequent illustrations which accom-
panied the same, and from savoring the author's pungent and incisive
analyses thereof have sharpened his expectation to the point where he is
eager for more. He is now, by the release of the third volume, assured
that his expectations are not to be thwarted or his hopes disappointed in
the slightest.
The second volume closed with an entry into the realm of conflict
of law as applied to contractual situations in general. It recognized
that two principles have come to receive the widest recognition; those of
party autonomy, or the right to choose the applicable law, on the one
hand, and the so-called "point of contact" doctrine, by which the con-
tract is to be governed by the law most closely connected with its chief
features, on the other. The third volume carries that thought forward
into a discussion of specialized contract problems such as relate to con-
tracts for the payment of money, the sale of movables and immovables,
of agency and employment, including workmen's compensation, of carriage
by land and sea, of insurance, and of suretyship, as well as to contractual-
like rights and duties arising from unjust enrichment. The book closes
with an extended treatment of modification and discharge of contracts by
* Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School.
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such matters as assignment, subrogation, novation, counterclaim and bar
by limitation.
There is no sign from the author that he relents, in any way, concern-
ing his attitude against the use of mechanical and ill-fitted rules or the
bolstering of obsolete concepts with ridiculous presumptions. He can, and
does, still take issue in not infrequent measure with the provincialisms
of the Restatement. His mastery of both the processes and the needs of
international trade, commerce and finance, his grasp of legal history and
legal developments are made evident on every page. It is only fair to say,
however, that as the work progresses it becomes more difficult for the
reader to follow every thought as the subject matter becomes that much the
more complex. Here is no simple black-letter text to while away the stu-
dent's, or lawyer's, time; more nearly, it may prove to be a challenge he
could not meet. He would, though, be the stronger for having made the
attempt. If nothing else be gained, he might learn that the American view
of the subject is not the only one and, frequently, not the best one either.
WATER RESOURCES LAW, Vol. III. Water Resources Policy Commission.
Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1950. Pp. xviii,
777, paper.
Pursuant to Executive Order, the Water Resources Policy Commis-
sion has been engaged in preparing a series of reports relating to the water
resources and water needs of the nation. The third of such reports has
now been released in the form of a complete review of all existing water-
resources legislation. It provides a comprehensive view of the numerous
laws, both state and federal, which, regardless of date of enactment or
actual impact on the subject, in any way concern the nation's water sup-
ply. Prepared in impersonal style, the report assembles a vast body of
material relating either to statutory regulation or to development of water
use, water power, drainage, flood control, navigation, land use and soil con-
servation. It is supplemented by extensive tables, indices and summaries.
While many of the points discussed will have slight concern for the
mid-western area of the continent, being more important in the west where
control of the water supply may be vital to life itself, the summary is
one which should receive attention in every part of the nation. The hodge-
podge of legislation on the subject alone, as revealed by this study, should
call for clarifying action. Waste arising from duplication of effort, if
not from direct conflict in responsibility, stands stark on almost every
page. Shifts in constitutional emphasis from the exercise of a clear power
over interstate commerce to specious reliance on the nebulous general wel-
fare clause bespeak of historical change in the approach to the subject
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of development and regulation of water supply. A growth in bureaucratic
power is also to be noted, even to the point where administrative discre-
tion in such matters has become of virtually unlimited character.
The raw materials of this report, then, present a picture which dis-
closes urgent need for a major revision in both scope and policy in order
that integration might not only eliminate conflicts and duplications in
authority but so that the gaps might be filled. The report itself draws
the conclusion that the "interests of present and future generations de-
mand it." The legal profession will, undoubtedly, await future recom-
mendations as to the form such revision should take. In the meantime, it
has, through this report, been furnished with materials from which it
might assemble its own conclusions.
LEGAL DRAFTING. Robert N. Cook. Brooklyn: The Foundation Press,
Inc., 1951. Pp. xxxvii, 867.
The "innocent" bystander who will project himself into a stream
of flying brickbats at a Donnybrook Fair has no one to blame for the
lumps he suffers than himself. Such a "fair" has been raging for over a
year between practicing lawyers on the one hand, utilizing the columns
of the American Bar Association Journal for their vantage paint,1 and
members of the law teaching profession, speaking through the pages of
the Journal of Legal Education,2 on the other. The pretext, if one is
ever needed for a good fight, turns on the capacity, or lack of capacity,
on the part of the typical law school graduate to perform the tasks be-
setting the practitioner the moment he receives the coveted license and
undertakes to represent clients. The criticism proceeds, aside from any
alleged general lack of ability, from the standpoint that the tyro is ill-
equipped to translate his theoretical knowledge of law into the actualities
to be faced in the daily routine of the law office.' The reply when not
couched in terms of confession and avoidance, is that the subject mat-
ter is not one capable of development in the professional school but must
await field training in the actual workshops of the law. This reviewer
refuses to expose himself to the dangers adhering to a life in the no-man's
1 See Roberts, "Performance Courses in the Study of Law," 36 A. B. A. J. 17
(1950); Connor, "Legal Education for What?" 37 A. B. A. J. 119 (1951) ; and
Cutler, "Inadequate Law School Training," 37 A. B. A. J. 203 (1951).
2 Compare the papers mentioned in note 1, ante, with Wilson, "A Practical Prac-
tice Court Course," 3 J. Legal Ed. 285 (1950) ; Shestock, "Legal Research and Writ-
ing," 3 J. Legal Ed. 126 (1950) ; MacDonald, "The Professional Aspects of Legal Edu-
cation," 2 J. Legal Ed. 444 (1950) ; Miller, "Clinical Training of Law Students," 2
J. Legal Ed. 298 (1950) ; Cavers, "'Skills' and Understanding," 1 J. Legal Ed. 395
(1949) ; Kalven, "Law School Training in Research and Exposition," 1 J. Legal Ed.
107 (1948). MacDonald, 2 J. Legal Ed. 444 at 451, states: ". . . I do not believe
that law schools can do very much of real value in this regard, because of their
inability to simulate the conditions of actual practice."
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land between these armed camps, nor wishes to suffer from the rapid
exchange going on between these verbal charges and retorts. There is
much to be said on either side.
It would seem as if Professor Cook, 4 from a similar recognition of
the fact that there is some merit to these charges, has worked conscien-
tiously toward a solution. A year or so back, reporting on the development
of a course in legal writing at Western Reserve University, he stated that
his description thereof was "necessarily a still picture of a growing
thing. Only the general directions of this growth have been indicated." 5
It is now possible, with the publication of his book, to announce that the
outlines of the picture and the record of that growth may now be seen
more sharply defined.
Here is no form book replete with ill-fitting clauses of ancient vintage
awaiting to be assembled by the draftsman into a crazy-quilt vestment
for the client's affairs. Here is no style book in composition, stuffed
with boresome and pedantic rules concerning syntax, punctuation and the
like. But the essence of these things, the large and small principles
which should govern legal writing, are presented in stimulating fashion
not for the ,guidance of students alone but for the practicing lawyer too.
The materials, as Professor Llewellyn has noted in his introduction, offer
a full background, an exploration into the policies and the problems in-
volved in the drafting of a wide variety of legal forms, an elaborate
check list of what to look out for, and frequent suggestions for lines
of wise action in type after type of transaction. Case law is not neglected,
but the emphasis is not thereon. The material is all there; all that re-
mains is to put it to use and the result should silence much of the furor to
be found in the cannonading referred to above.
3 Says Roberts, 36 A. B. A. J. 17 at 20, the graduate "... 'passed' contracts, but
he never wrote one ... He may have led his class in wills, yet, he has never pre-
pared one ... His course in trusts has been similar, but his knowledge of how to
prepare the necessary documents for their establishment and execution is even
smaller than his knowledge of decedent's estates." Cutler, 37 A. B. A. J. 203 at 204,
adds: "All the theory in the world ill equips the lawyer who has all the legal lore
at his fingertips, but [who] doesn't know how to draw a summons, a will, a deed
or a bill of sale. To know the cy pres doctrine ... is a necessary part of a lawyer's
legal background. It is also important that he know how to use the words required
in a simple petition to appoint an administrator of an estate." He offers, as his
solution, a period of apprenticeship dealing with actual matters in a law office under
the supervision of a member of the bar prior to the granting of the license.
4 Yes, the author is one of the schoolmen, not of the practitioner class, being a
member of the faculty of law at Western Reserve University. He is, but not to his
shame, one of those whom Connor, 37 A. B. A. J. 119, would point to with a degree
of scorn for having "only one year of practice" or for revealing "no experience in
the practice of law at all !" The author's practical experience is somewhat broader,
but not by much. See biographical details in Teachers' Directory, Association of
American Law Schools, 1950-51, p. 83. The book in question should prove that the
theorist can also get practical.
5 Cook. "Teaching Legal Writing Effectively In Separate Courses," 2 J. Legal Ed.
87 (1949), at 91.
